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Abstract 
 
The concept of women empowerment was the outcome of several important critiques and 
debates generated by the women’s movement throughout the world, and particularly in the 
developing countries. In essence, the 1980s saw the rise of stringent feminist critiques of 
development strategies and grassroots interventions: mainly for these strategies having 
generally failed to make any significant dent in the status of women. The failure was 
ascribed to the adaptation and the application of such approaches as welfare, antipoverty, 
and to some extent the efficiency approach. Presently, the users of the term 
‘empowerment’ tend to assume an understanding of the meaning within some particular 
context. Often no clear explanation of empowerment is given. We believe that some of the 
confusion arises because the root concept –  power –itself is disputed, and so is understood 
and experienced in different ways by different people. In fact, the underlying assumption of 
many interest groups or institutions (such as the World Bank and the UN) unfortunately  
is that economic empowerment automatically converts to women’s empowerment. 
 
As the following epistemic quest of empowerment unfolds in six sections, the major issue 
reflected upon is the concept of empowerment in its importance to women’s development. 
We begin in the next section by exploring the definitions of empowerment and then dissects 
the concept of power in section 3: the concept is discussed in the subsequent sections 
from different perspectives of power, feminism and personal autonomy and agency in the 
family framework. We consider three approaches here: theory of human needs, self-
determination theory and capability approach. The last section concludes the paper. 
 
  
 
3 
 
 
 
 
Women Empowerment:  
An Epistemic Quest 
 
 
Vijayamohanan Pillai N. 
 
B. P. Asalatha 
 
 
 
 
1. What is Empowerment? 
 
A review of definitions of empowerment reveals both diversity and commonality, because of 
the variation in terminology used to encompass the concept. The literature contains a 
range of terms, concepts and data that may be relevant for assessing ‘empowerment’; 
thus, various studies have aimed at measuring women’s  
i) “autonomy” (for example, Dyson and Moore 1983; Basu and Basu 1991; 
Jeejebhoy and Sathar 2001),  
ii) “agency,” (for example, Pillai and Alkire 2007) 
iii) “status” (for example, Gage 1995; Tzannatos 1999),  
iv) “women’s land rights” (for example, Quisumbing et al. 1999),  
v) “domestic economic power” (for example, Mason 1998),  
vi) “bargaining power” (for example, Beegle et al. 1998; Hoddinott and Haddad 
1995; Quisumbing and de la Briere 2000)  
vii) “power” (for example, Agarwal 1997; Beegle et al., 1998; Pulerwitz et al. 
2000),  
viii) “patriarchy” (for example, Malhotra et al. 1995),  
ix) “gender equality” (World Bank 2001a & 2000b), or  
x) “gender discrimination”.  
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Notwithstanding the similarities in the concepts underlying many of these terms, we 
think that the concept of empowerment can be distinguished from others based on its 
unique definitional elements. Thus, the first essential element of empowerment is that it 
is a process  “whereby women become able to organize themselves to increase their own 
self-reliance, to assert their independent right to make choices and to control resources 
which will assist in challenging and eliminating their own ‘socio-political’ 
subordination.” (Keller and Mbwewe 1991; also see Kabeer 2001; Chen 1992; Rowlands 
1995, Oxaal and Baden 1997). None of the other concepts explicitly encompasses a 
progression from one state (gender inequality) to another (gender equality). Much of the 
emphasis on empowerment as a process is found in the conceptual literature, but this 
understanding is also beginning to be incorporated into the frameworks of empirical 
studies. For example, even as Jejeebhoy (2000) considers autonomy and empowerment 
to be fairly similar, she argues that the former is a static state – and thus measurable by 
most available indicators – while the latter is a change over time, and not so easily 
measurable.  
 
The second element of empowerment that distinguishes it from other concepts is agency 
– in other words, women themselves must be significant actors in the process of change 
that is being described or measured (Gita Sen 1993; Mehra 1997). Thus, hypothetically 
there could be an improvement in indicators of gender equality, but unless the 
intervening processes involve women as agents of that change rather than merely as its 
recipients, we would not consider it empowerment. However desirable, it would merely 
be an improvement in outcomes from one point in time to another. The importance of 
agency in the discourse on empowerment emerges from ‘bottom up’ rather than ‘top 
down’ approaches toward development (Oxaal and Baden 1997; Rowlands 1995; 
Narayan et al. 2000a; 2000b). At the institutional and aggregate levels, it emphasizes the 
importance of participation and ‘social inclusion’ (Friedmann 1992; Chambers 1997; 
Narayan et al. 2000a; 2000b) At the micro level, it is embedded in the idea of self-
efficacy and the significance of the realization by individual women that they can be the 
agents of change in their own lives.  
 
Further, Ellen McWhirter (1991) identifies empowerment as the process by which 
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people, organizations, or groups who are powerless become aware of the power dynamics 
at work in their life, develop the skills and capacity for gaining some reasonable control 
over their lives and exercise this control without infringing upon the rights of others. 
Following McWhirter’s (1991) definition of empowerment, it becomes apparent that 
empowerment has a specific focus in women’s development in the developing countries. 
According to her, a process whereby women become able to organize themselves to increase 
their own self-reliance, to assert their own self-reliance, to assert their independent right to make 
choices and to control resources, will assist in challenging and eliminating their own 
subordination in the households. 
 
Empowerment, according to the World Bank, is the process of increasing the capacity of 
individuals or groups to make choices and to transform those choices into desired actions 
and outcomes. Central to this process are actions which both build the individual and 
collective assets of the poor and improve the efficiency and fairness of the organizational and 
institutional context that govern the use of these assets (World Bank Poverty Analysis 
2003). Furthermore, the World Bank 2003 Annual Report and other World Bank reports 
since the early 1990s, recognize that empowerment is very vital to overall progress in 
development as it “ensures that all people have the ability to shape their own lives by 
providing opportunity and security and fostering effective participation and social 
inclusion” (The World Bank Annual report 2003).1 Nonetheless, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, some commentators found the World Bank shifting slightly to a revised neo-
liberal model, stressing market-friendly state intervention and good governance (see 
Peet and Hartwick 1999). Gradually the concept of empowerment, especially through 
microcredit schemes became the catchphrase for every women’s development programme 
initiated by the World Bank in the developing countries. 
 
In its written statement, the World Bank has maintained its commitment to a gender 
mainstreaming strategy, but evidence emerging from developing countries indicates its 
policies do not achieve this. The World Bank has been criticized for paying only lip service 
to women’s issues by different quarters, especially the feminist organizations who maintain 
that the World Bank’s development programmes mainly support male interests. As 
                                                          
1
 http://www.worldbank.org/html/extpb/2003/download_report.html. Accessed on 25 March 2009. 
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Marina Lazreg (2002) has noted, “the World Bank is subsuming the concrete under the 
abstract, practice under theory, resulting in the blurring, if not the obliteration of the difference, 
or the often noted lack of fit between theories and practices of development”. Therefore, the 
question is: “How does the World Bank plan to challenge the existing socio-cultural practices 
or patriarchal structures that are at the root of women’s disempowerment while in 
the pursuit of the “efficiency approach?” (sought to increase women’s productivity in order 
to enhance their quality of lives).  And how empowering are World Bank policies and 
programmes when they are implemented in the form of ‘power-over’? 
 
It is unfortunate that with the increasing dominance of the ‘financial sustainability 
paradigm’ by institutions like the World Bank, the UN and other international donors, 
definitions of empowerment have become diluted to mean insignificant increases in 
individual income and ‘self-confidence’.  
 
2. Power and Empowerment 
 
At the core of the concept of empowerment is the idea of power. Power can be 
understood as operating in different ways and its conceptualisation varies from context to 
context. In fact, some explanation is grounded in an understanding that power will be seen 
and understood differently by people who inhabit various positions in power 
structures. Power in a traditional sense denotes a force exercised by individuals or 
groups. Foucault (1982) observed that “power is a set of actions that act on other possible 
actions – it functions in the field of the possible or inscribes itself in the behaviour of 
actors by inciting, inducing, seducing, facilitating or hindering, expanding or limiting”. In 
sum, Foucault’s model of power involves recognizing the existence of multiple power 
relations. “Power”, he wrote, “is considered to circulate and to be exercised rather than 
possessed”. Foucault maintains ‘resistance’, where individuals contest fixed identities and 
relations in ways which may be subtle, is seen as an inevitable companion of power. 
Max Weber (1922) on the other hand placed ‘power’ as the probability that one actor 
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, 
regardless of the basis on which this probability rests (cited in Presser and Sen 2000). 
According to Janet Townsend et al. (1999) in reference to power relations within a 
household: “Power consists primarily in being able to take a decision, which will affect 
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someone else, or in acting to force, confine, forbid or prevent. Whoever exercises such power 
subordinates and degrades, forces actions, exercises control and assumes the right to punish, 
seize material property, infringe symbolic rights and dominate in every respect.” 
 
They pointed out that such understanding of power is very common and 
considered ‘natural’ in Latin America or Africa with a long history of colonialism, 
dictatorships and military government. Lukes (1974) on the other hand pointed out that “The 
most effective and insidious use of power is to prevail by shaping people’s perceptions, 
cognitions and preferences in such way that they accept their role in the existing order of 
things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as 
natural and unchangeable or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial.” 
 
Hence, when a control becomes internalized, it is no longer necessary to assert power 
overtly. Indeed, there is overwhelming evidence to show that a group of people, 
especially women who live in a predominantly patriarchal society, can be denied power or 
basic rights. Because what patriarchal institutions tolerate, expect, and reward is ‘different 
forms of obedience’ – such as conformity and uniformity – all inspired and maintained by 
fear (French 1985; cited in Rowan-Campbell 1999). For instance, when a woman is 
constantly subjected to violent abuse, cultural constraints or self-invalidations as a result of 
her surroundings, she often fails to express her own view because internalized oppression 
directly or indirectly influences her ability to protest. Indeed, some form of power or exercise 
of power is sometimes visible and sometimes invisible: that is to say, power is not always 
overt, and the reasons for decisions are not always easily visible. There are 
overwhelming debates on the notion of power; however, its discussion here would dwell 
mainly on its relationship to women’s empowerment. 
 
Rowlands (1997) has noted that such definitions focus with varying degrees of subtlety on the 
ability of one person or group to get another person or group to do something against 
their will. Such power could be described as ‘zero-sum’: the more power one person has, 
the less the other has. 
 
The definition of power in relation to domination and obedience as stated above, 
contrasts with views in generative terms, such as the power some people have of 
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stimulating activity in others. This form of power is not zero-sum; an increase in one 
person’s power does not necessarily weaken that of another (Rowlands 1997, Page and 
Czuba 1999). The term ‘empowerment’ refers to ‘power-to’ and it is achieved by 
increasing one’s ability to resist and challenge ‘power-over’. It implies more than a forced 
change of power in which there is a destruction of previous structures and values. It 
entails an increase of consciousness. For example, the commonly held belief in micro-credit  
 
Table 1: Concepts of Power 
Sources: Rowlands (1995), Kabeer (1994), Mayoux (2005) 
 
 
schemes is that providing women with access to credit is a powerful tool which stimulates 
activities in women and directly leads to their empowerment and subsequently 
promotes gender equity. Hence, growth of capital and its control not only sensitizes poor 
women, but augments their ‘power’ relation in the household and community. 
Consequently, the concept of power seems to come in more than one essence as this is 
Concepts of power Practical Applications 
Power Over Related directly or indirectly to domination and 
subordination, it controls people and is associated with 
conflict between powerful and powerless groups. 
Power To Creative or productive, increasing individual’s capacity 
for leadership, it generates ability so that people can 
make decisions and solve problems on their own. It 
shows new possibilities and actions without 
domination. 
Power Within Self-esteem and confidence, self-respect and self-
acceptance and acceptance of others; it generates individual 
critical analytical skills 
Power With Enabling women to examine and articulate their 
collective interests, to organize to achieve them and to 
link with other women’s and men’s organizations for 
change. 
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clearly reflected in feminist understanding. Table 1 above is a summary of feminist 
understanding of power: 
 
These multiple connotations of power further unveil the complexity surrounding the 
concept of empowerment, and how it can be stimulated. For example, taking the concept of 
empowerment beyond simply control of resources, Naila Kabeer (1994) observes that 
empowerment as a concept with theoretical and practical potential merits being more 
than an empty terminology. Deconstructing the perception of power, she maintains: “The 
multidimensional nature of power suggests that empowerment strategies for women must 
build on ‘the power within’ as a necessary adjunct to improving their ability to control 
resources, to determine agendas and make decisions.”  
 
She reasons that power from within needs “experiential recognition and analysis” of issues to 
do with women’s own subordination and how it is maintained. For instance, she notes: “For 
women in particular, in societies where deeply-entrenched and internalized cultural rules, 
norms and values not only tend to devalue their worth and well-being but also to 
militate against recognition by women themselves of what is often described as ‘lack of 
equity in the ruling arrangement’. The power of social conditioning in shaping the 
‘choices’ that women make, to the extent that they may be resigned to, and indeed 
actively promote, the distribution of resources which discriminate against themselves and 
their daughters, cannot be underestimated.” (Kabeer 1996) 
 
She further points out that such power ‘cannot be given; it has to be self-generated’. That is 
to be understood as the need to move beyond project participation into the realm of 
policymaking. Indeed, certain aspects of culture or norms enable women in some 
communities to negotiate and maintain some degrees of power within their families or 
lineages. This understanding creates possibilities to avoid making absolute claims about the 
outcomes of empowerment process.  
 
Now we turn to examine the different understandings of empowerment, especially as 
perceived by feminist scholars. 
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3. Empowerment: Feminist Understanding 
 
The meaning of empowerment can be seen to relate to the user’s understanding of power. 
In fact, the idea of empowerment is increasingly employed as a tool for understanding 
what is needed to transform the condition of poor (especially women) or underprivileged people 
(see Sen and Grown 1987). As Rowlands (1999) noted, in this context, there is broad 
agreement that empowerment is a process; that it involves some degree of personal 
development; but it is not necessarily sufficient in itself; it also involves moving from 
insight to action. 
 
Indeed, many feminists, especially those who are categorically classified as Western feminists, 
uphold the assumption of empowerment through speech (giving voice). These feminists 
(especially those within the WID fold with the earlier equity approach; see Pillai, 
Asalatha and Ponnuswamy 2009) argue that cultivating women’s voice endorses their 
creativity and promotes more active and collaborative improvement in their lives. Thus, 
they encourage poor women to engage in dialogue across differences, and to apply 
knowledge which is accumulated through interactions to address issues that 
disempowered them. Marianne Marchand, for example, in her 1995 book, draws attention to 
the significance of “witness accounts” as a positive way for women to express their 
“feelings” about development. These interpretations of empowerment are concerned with the 
processes by which people become aware of their own interests and how these relate to 
those of others, in order for both to participate from a position of greater strength in 
decision-making and to actually influence such decisions. In contrast, Marnia Lazreg (2002) 
argues that: “Encouraging voice evinces a desire for power, a will to power, the power to 
carve out spaces for others by convening them to talk about themselves under the fiction 
of polyphony and multiple authorship which are meant to aid local women to acquire 
voice.” 
 
Thus, building on Bourdieu’s theoretical vocabulary, Lazreg (2002) argues that ideas and 
theories of development belong to a system of relations between individuals and groups 
representing ‘force’ that position themselves for a struggle over their relevance, 
legitimacy and/or practical applications. This means that whoever engages the field of 
development from the perspective of gender must also critically engage their own interest 
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as part of the force that sustains it and reproduces it. “The implication being that these 
women are solicited, cajoled, encouraged to speak because of a need to create discursive 
spaces which allow women (especially in the developing countries) to be heard”. Importantly, 
Lazreg questioned the abilities of some feminists to transform ‘development-as-usual’ by 
uncovering its simplicity using a totalising, evolutionary and patronising view of peoples 
of the developing countries. The ‘giving voices’ to women presumes that these women 
were/are mute; yet, these women have always spoken about their misery or happiness. 
Although these stories often attract advice, and sometimes counselling, they neither change 
the home front nor contribute to women’s empowerment. Indeed, Lazreg lamented the 
transformation of women’s lives into a discourse, and the indignities of making other 
women speak for ‘us’. She notes that this form of analysis cannot account for women’s 
poverty and struggles to survive, pointing to the limits of discourse analysis and its inability to 
resolve the view that female subjectivity is socially constructed (Lazreg 2002). 
 
Further, some groups of feminists have argued that empowerment corresponds to women 
challenging existing power structures which subordinate them. For instance, according to an 
article in the Oxfam Handbook of Relief and Development: “Empowerment involves 
challenging the forms of oppression that compel millions of people to play a part in their 
society on terms which are inequitable, or in ways which deny their human rights.” 
(Eade and Williams 1995: 8). 
 
In contrast, some feminists from the developing countries (Kabeer 1997, Lazreg 2002, 
Izugbara 2004) have argued against these sweeping generalizations of women’s oppression, 
and the need to liberate women from “Themselves”, their men, their culture and their 
former colonizers to be more or less ‘like Us’. The implication here is that women in the 
developing countries are positioned “as a symptom of the over-determined effects and 
resistances to multiple oppressions and exploitative processes, hence the role of the 
feminists as liberators” (Lazreg 2002). Furthermore, there is no doubt that when feminists in 
the North involve themselves in the cause of women in the South, they can be open to 
accusations of cultural imperialism, especially if they suggest that women in cultures other 
than ‘our own’ are disadvantaged or oppressed by the elements of their culture. There is a need 
to change or transform such culture to accommodate or protect women’s interest, but based 
on the fact that feminists in the North are a product of western social history their 
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solutions are not always appropriate in this non-western context and are thus perceived as 
patronizing. Claims of gender equality are historically embedded in a moral order that is 
constructed predominantly in terms of equality, individual rights and personal choice. 
However, DAWN stresses the need for economic and social change, empowerment of 
women, and progressive changes in public-private relations to benefit women (Sen and 
Grown 1987).  
 
Empowerment according to DAWN is essentially a radical transformation of the life and 
livelihood of the poor and of the marginalized members of human society, especially 
women. Srilatha Batliwala (1995) has made a detailed analysis of women’s empowerment 
programmes, based on her analysis of Integrated Rural Development (IRD) in India. 
Women’s empowerment, she argues, is the process, and the outcome of the process, by 
which women gain greater control over material and intellectual resources, and 
challenge the ideology of patriarchy and gender-based discrimination against women in all 
the institutions and structures of society. Unlike Oxfam, Batliwala stresses that empowerment is 
a spiral, not a cycle or linear, which leads to greater and greater changes. These changes 
are consciousness-raising, problem identification, action for change and analysis of that 
action whose outcome leads to higher levels of consciousness and more effective strategies. 
In other words, the empowerment spiral transforms every person involved: the individual 
(including the change agent), the collective, and the environment although not 
necessarily at the same pace or depth. By this definition, therefore, empowerment cannot be 
a top-down or one-way process, nor merely a change of consciousness or equality, but a 
visible manifestation of that change which the world around is forced to acknowledge. 
Batliwala argues that empowerment therefore means making informed choices within an 
expanding framework of information, knowledge and analysis of available options. 
After all, choices can only be made within the menu of known or experienced possibilities 
(for example; being able to trade or farm without restrictions, sell or purchase directly 
or indirectly from primary users or sellers). Empowerment is thus a process which must 
enable women to discover new possibilities, new options and a growing repertoire of 
choices. 
 
Likewise, Caroline Moser (1989) addresses empowerment as the control of resources; but she 
pays more attention to the individual’s level rather than the group’s level. The focus here 
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is on women’s right to make choices and their capacity to control and be in charge of their 
life. Moser has also argued that empowerment is the capacity for women to increase their 
own self-reliance and internal strength. In addition, Moser (ibid.) recognizes the 
significance for women to determine choices in their lives and to influence the 
direction of change through ability to gain control over material and nonmaterial resources. 
 
In sum, DAWN explains that it is the experiences lived by poor women throughout 
developing countries in their struggle to ensure the basic survival of their families and 
themselves that provides the clearest lens for an understanding of the diversity of 
empowerment and development processes. DAWN affirms that it is their aspirations and 
struggles for a future free of the multiple oppressions of gender, class, race and nation, 
which can form the basis for the new visions and strategies (Sen and Grown 1987). 
Accordingly, the perspective of poor women is grounded in their social location and is 
regarded as centred on the problems of poverty and inequality. The group (DAWN) 
further stresses that empowerment entails a critical reflection and conceptualization of the 
southern feminist perspective, thereby rejecting the monolithic viewpoint of Western 
feminists, while affirming heterogeneity and diverse feminisms.2 Nonetheless, DAWN 
recognized the common opposition to gender oppression. Accordingly, empowerment 
represents the transformation of power relations throughout society, increased wellbeing, 
community development, self-sufficiency, expansion of individual choices and capacities 
for self-reliance. Overall, it goes without saying that ‘voice’ remains an important part 
among other factors of empowerment. However, it should not be made to take precedence 
over resources and other substantial issues pointed out by DAWN. As Parpart (2002) 
clearly states: “Ironically, giving people voice does not always empower the poor, 
especially women... The power associated with gossip and information, the ability to 
decide when, where and with whom it will be shared, reminds us that giving ‘voice’ to 
women (or men), especially in public, is not always empowering...  Moreover seeking 
the ‘voices’ of Third world women has too often become a means for building the careers 
of development ‘experts’ rather than an empathetic attempt to bridge cultural and 
material divides.” 
 
                                                          
2
 For example, Chandra Mohanty (1989) contests an inclination to reduce the heterogeneity of developing 
countries women into a monolithic subject, a habit that is conceived of as a discursive colonization. 
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4. Empowerment and Autonomy  
 
In a famous essay first published in 1958, Isaiah Berlin divided freedom (liberty) into 
negative and positive (Berlin 1969). In the first case liberty seems to be a mere absence 
of something (i.e. of obstacles, barriers, constraints or interference from others), whereas 
in the second case it seems to require the presence of something (i.e. of control, self-
mastery, self-determination or self-realization). The negative concept of liberty is 
involved in the answer to the question “What is the area within which the subject – a 
person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, 
without interference by other persons?”, and the positive concept in the answer to the 
question: “What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine 
someone to do, or be, this rather than that?” (Berlin 1969). 
 
To promote negative freedom is to promote the existence of a sphere of action within 
which the individual is sovereign, and within which she can pursue her own projects 
subject only to the constraint that she respect the spheres of others. The defenders of the 
negative concept of freedom compare the development of an individual to that of a plant: 
individuals, like plants, must be allowed to grow, in the sense of developing their own 
faculties to the full and according to their own inner logic. Personal growth is something 
that cannot be imposed from without, but must come from within the individual. 
 
Critics, however, have objected that this ideal looks much more like a positive concept of 
liberty than a negative one. Positive liberty consists in exactly this growth of the 
individual: the free individual is one that develops, determines and changes her own 
desires and interests autonomously and from within. This is not liberty as the mere 
absence of obstacles, but liberty as autonomy or self-realization. There is no guarantee 
that the mere absence of state interference should ensure such growth. This in turn 
suggests that freedom in its totality should include both the negative and positive 
spheres: absence of constraints along with the presence of the conditions for self-
determination. And this constitutes autonomy in our view, even though some 
conceptions of positive freedom are often taken as equivalent to what is often meant by 
autonomy. 
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It should be noted that some feminists dismiss autonomy as an androcentric relic of 
modernism (Jaggar 1983; Addelson 1994; Hekman 1995; Card 1996), while others assert 
women’s need for self-determination (de Lauretis 1986; King 1988; Lugones and 
Spelman 1983; Govier 1993). In the light of the history of figuring women as driven by 
their reproductive biology and in need of rational male guidance and the history of 
women's enforced economic dependence on men or relegation to poorly paid, often 
despised forms of labor, feminists can hardly ignore the topic of self-determination. 
Thus, a number of feminist philosophers take up this challenge and present accounts of 
autonomy that do not devalue the interpersonal capacities and social contributions that 
are conventionally coded feminine (Nedelsky 1989; Meyers 1989 and 2000; Benhabib 
1995 and 1999; Weir 1995). In feminist accounts, autonomy is not conflated with self-
sufficiency and free will, but rather it is seen to be facilitated by supportive relationships 
and also to be a matter of degree.  
 
The theory of human needs 
 
Autonomy has a central role in the theory of human needs (THN) developed by Doyal 
and Gough (1991) to assess quality of life according to the degree to which a series of 
needs has been satisfied. The first universal goal, according to this theory, is to achieve 
full social participation, which requires satisfying two universal needs: (a) physical 
health, and (b) autonomy as freedom of agency, and the second universal goal is to 
promote critical participation by fulfilling the two previous needs and developing critical 
autonomy. 
 
Autonomy as freedom of agency at the first level has the following elements: 
• Level of understanding a person has about herself, her culture and what is 
expected of her as an individual within it. 
• The psychological capacity she has to formulate options for herself. 
• The objective opportunities enabling her to act accordingly. 
 
And critical autonomy at the second level has the following elements: 
• The capacity to compare cultural rules, to reflect upon the rules of one’s own 
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culture and to work with others to change them. 
• The capacity to move to another culture if everything else fails (in extremis). 
 
 
Self-determination theory  
 
Another theory of autonomy is the self-determination theory (SDT) – a theory of relative 
autonomy (Deci and Ryan, 1985), which considers three basic psychological needs, 
namely, those for autonomy, relatedness and competence. Autonomy is the universal 
urge to be the causal agents of one’s own life and to act in harmony with one’s integrated 
self; relatedness is the universal desire to interact, be connected to, and experience caring 
for others; and competence is that which seeks to control the outcome and experience 
mastery. When these three needs are supported and satisfied within a social context, 
people experience more vitality, self‐motivation, and well‐being. Conversely, the 
thwarting or frustration of these basic needs leads to diminished self‐motivation and 
greater ill‐being; in fact, need-thwarting is entailed in the aetiology of many forms of 
psychopathology (see Ryan et al. 2006). 
 
 
SDT has been developed and researched through a set of five mini‐theories, which 
together comprise the theory’s formal framework: 
 
1. Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET) concerns intrinsic motivation, motivation 
that is based on the satisfactions of doing something for its own sake, and that 
applies to activities such as play, sport, and leisure. CET stresses the importance 
of autonomy and competence to intrinsic motion, and argues that events that are 
perceived to detract from these will diminish intrinsic motivation. CET 
specifically addresses how factors such as rewards, deadlines, feedback and 
pressure affect feelings of autonomy and competence and thus enhance or 
undermine intrinsic motivation. For instance CET explains why some reward 
structures, for example, financial incentives, actually detract from subsequent 
motivation, a phenomenon that is often called ‘the undermining effect of 
rewards’ (Deci, Koestner and Ryan, 1999). 
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2. Organismic Integration Theory (OIT), addresses the process of internalization of 
various extrinsic motives. Here the focus is on the continuum of internalization, 
extending from (i) external regulation, to (ii) introjection (for example, engaging 
in behaviors to avoid guilt or feel approval), to (iii) identification, to (iv) 
integration. These forms of regulation, which can be simultaneously operative, 
differ in their relative autonomy, with external regulation being the least 
autonomous form of extrinsic motivation and integrated regulation the most 
autonomous. SDT research show that the more autonomous the person’s 
motivation, the greater their persistence, performance, and wellbeing at an 
activity or within a domain. OIT further suggests that internalization and 
integration is facilitated by contextual supports for autonomy, competence, and 
relatedness. That is, individuals are more likely to internalize and integrate a 
practice or value if they experience choice with respect to it, efficacy in engaging 
in it, and connection with those who convey it. Considerable research across the 
globe shows that greater internalization of cultural practices is associated with 
greater wellness and performance (Ryan and Deci, 2000). 
 
3. Causality Orientations Theory (COT) describes individual differences in how 
people orient to different aspects of the environment in regulating behaviour. 
COT describes and assesses three types of causality-orientations: the autonomy-
orientation in which persons act out of interest in and valuing of what is 
occurring; the control-orientation in which the focus is on rewards, gains, and 
approval; and the impersonal- or amotivated-orientation characterized by lack of 
personal control or competence (see Table 4.4). COT is also used to explain how 
primes or prior stimuli activate certain orientations in people, affecting 
subsequent motivation. 
 
4. Basic Psychological Needs Theory (BPNT) elaborates on the concept of basic 
needs (autonomy, competence, and relatedness) by connecting them directly with 
wellbeing. Therefore, contexts that support versus thwart these needs should 
invariantly impact wellness. The theory argues that all three needs are essential 
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and that if any is thwarted there will be distinct functional costs. Research on 
BPNT shows that aggregate need satisfaction predicts individual differences in 
health and wellness, as well as within-person fluctuations in wellness across time. 
 
5. Goal Contents Theory (GCT), grows out of the distinctions between intrinsic and 
extrinsic goals and their impact on motivation and wellness. Research has shown 
that materialism and other extrinsic goals such as fame or image do not tend to 
enhance need satisfaction, and thus do not foster wellbeing, even when one is 
successful at attaining them (Kasser and Ryan, 1996; Niemiec et al. 2009). In 
contrast, goals such as intimate relationships, personal growth, or contributing to 
one’s community are conducive to need satisfaction, and therefore facilitate 
health and wellness. GCT has also been applied to how goals are framed. 
Evidence suggests that goals framed toward intrinsic aims are better adhered to 
than those focused on extrinsic outcomes (Vansteenkiste et al., 2006). 
 
 
Contexts and events can influence motivation when people engage in project activities. 
Ellerman (2006) uses a foreground/background model to explain motivation and 
autonomy. Autonomy is supported, he explains, when internal motivation is in the 
foreground, although extrinsic motivation could be in the background. For instance, 
people could work in self-construction activities for the welfare of their community (in 
the foreground) but also be receiving a minimum payment (in the background). If the 
subsistence need was threatened because the tough work conditions made it impossible 
for people to carry out other activities, the extrinsic motivation would pass into the 
foreground because it would be what helps satisfy that need. It is then possible to 
introduce extrinsic motivation as long as it does not change the locus of causality. 
 
 
Given these frameworks, empowerment may be taken as an ongoing process whereby 
one is empowered by her gradual development actions. The essence is to be able to gain 
ability, informed authority and agency to make decisions and implement changes at a higher 
level than previously allowed or thought possible. The key issues arising from this 
illustration are: 
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(i) A substantial degree of independence or freedom especially from husband; 
and 
 
(ii) Adequate options to make political and socio-economic choices 
 
Both are major characteristics of personal autonomy and a reflection of DAWN’s 
perception of empowerment, which centres on women’s ‘personal autonomy’. In 
essence, the ideal of personal autonomy as envisaged in the empirical studies is the vision of 
people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive 
decisions throughout their lives. This form of personal autonomy is a shift from DAWN 
or WID’s understanding of absolute personal autonomy. This is because in the developing 
world, women’s crucial economic contributions do not diminish men’s status as 
household heads; as wives, women still show deference to their husband and see to most 
domestic needs of the family.  
 
The above idea foregrounds the basis on which most women participate in economic 
activities or even in microcredit schemes. It connotes the idea of empowerment as 
understood by the developing world women. In part it forms the basis of the definition of 
empowerment in this study. Thus, perceptibly, personal autonomy does not stand aloof 
from DAWN’s suggestion. It is embedded in the notion of ‘family’. This version of 
empowerment places emphasis on the wellbeing of women and their families, especially 
children’s future rather than simply individual’s achievements: say, unrestricted personal 
mobility (which is said to enhance their economic participation) separately from their 
husbands especially during the early stage of their marriage; freedom to make choices; 
and a degree of financial security in the event of husband’s death. Further, here the 
financial security includes the assurance that family properties and capital are not acceded 
to in-laws or other relatives of the husband on his death. Empowerment at this level is 
not embedded in individualistic motives of these women. Indeed, accomplishments are 
often located in the wellbeing of their children. It also suggests economic gains allow 
them to help and provide for their children, contribute to their lineages and maintain a strong 
financial independence from their husband. 
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In view of this, empowerment here is seen as the power (that is, ‘power within’) to control 
one’s life; to take decisions or make choices which influence one’s life as well as that of their 
family. That is, power that ensures the wellbeing of their family and protects them from the 
overbearing dominance of husband and to some extent society. This form of empowerment, 
although different from the mainstream definition, nonetheless exhibits many 
characteristics of virtuous spiral as described by Linda Catherine Mayoux (2006). These 
include increased status and changing roles for women, income under women’s control, 
increased wellbeing of children, women’s participation in decisions about saving and 
credit use, and their ability to negotiate change in gender relations. 
 
5. Empowerment, Autonomy and Agency 
 
Another element related to the concept of empowerment is ‘human agency’, usually 
defined (i) as the capacity, condition, or state of acting or of exerting power, and (ii) as a 
person or thing through which power is exerted or an end is achieved. How can one have 
the ability to act with power?  
 
According to Amartya Sen, one can attain agency through the acquisition of certain 
capabilities and freedoms. In Development as Freedom, Sen defines an agent “as 
someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in 
terms of her own values and objectives … particularly the agency role of the individual 
as a member of the public and as a participant in economic, social, and political 
actions…” (Sen 1999). According to his capabilities approach to development, those 
who lack certain fundamental freedoms are not able to lead the lives they wish to lead. In 
environments in which people are faced with lack of physical well-being, economic 
freedom, a political voice, or disenfranchisement, a person may not be able to exercise 
her agency to engage in opportunities or make decisions that further fulfill her life goals. 
There is a strong relationship between agency and the social, economic, and political 
environment in which a person lives. Sen notes that our individual agency is inextricably 
tied to and “constrained by the social, political and economic opportunities that are 
available to us” and that we must recognize the “force of social influences on the extent 
and reach of individual freedom,” or our autonomy (Sen 1999). Without the basic 
freedoms, a person is not able to fully exercise his or her opportunities to live a full and 
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valued life. With these freedoms in place, a person can exercise her agency in 
determining the scope and direction of her life. Thus agency has a crucial role, given its 
transformative potential. Agency is “the ability of people to help themselves and to 
influence the world” (Sen 1999). He proposes that the situation of individuals can be 
evaluated in respect of either their agency or well-being. In the first case, individuals are 
seen as doers and judges; while, in the second case, they are seen as beneficiaries whose 
interests and advantages must be considered (Sen 1985). 
 
Sen (1985; 1996; 2002/2003) classifies freedom into two types: ‘process’ and 
‘opportunity’ freedom. Process freedom is the control that a person has over the process 
of choice. The person has relevant options and takes decisions, although she might not 
achieve her goals. Opportunity freedom is the power that a person has to achieve her 
goals because either the person makes successful choices or the outcomes are caused by 
others. For instance, if a project provides a water system without the participation of 
users in any of the project stages, their opportunity freedom, but not their process 
freedom, increases. 
 
For Sen, individuals can make choices considering whatever objectives they have; Sen 
uses another term ‘functionings’ to refer to the capabilities that a person actually uses or 
participates in. Capabilities, then, are the full set of functionings that are feasible for a 
given person. Functionings are valuable partly because they are the result of choice. Both 
negative and positive freedom are relevant (Sen, 1996) as reflected by his analysis of 
process and opportunity freedom, respectively. However, capabilities refer to freedom 
“in the positive sense: what real opportunities you have regarding the life you want to 
lead” (Sen 1987). Thus capabilities can have intrinsic value by adding worthwhile 
options or positive freedoms to one’s life (Sen 1999; Crocker 1992, 1995). 
 
Sen focuses on “substantive freedoms” as key to relieving poverty and other challenges 
that people in poor countries face. Besides poverty, “tyranny, poor economic 
opportunities … social deprivation” are the “major sources of unfreedom” (Sen 1999). 
He identifies five types of freedoms that he views as “instrumental” (Sen 1999). These 
include “political freedoms,” “economical facilities,” “social opportunities,” 
“transparency guarantees” and “protective security” (Sen 1999). These freedoms are both 
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an end and a means in facilitating economic development and, for our purposes, quality 
of life. Identifying access to freedoms and capabilities, allows us to compare the 
economic and societal successes across cultures.  
 
Martha Nussbaum expands on Sen’s freedoms and functionings; the guiding thought 
behind her approach is “one that lies at the heart of [John] Rawls’ project...the idea of the 
citizen as a free and dignified human being.” (Nussbaum 1999). She affirms a “liberal” 
view that is compatible with the feminist affirmation of the value of women as persons. 
“At the heart of this tradition [of liberal political thought] is a twofold intuition about 
human beings: namely, that all, just by being human, are of equal dignity and worth, no 
matter where they are situated in society, and that the primary source of this worth is a 
power of moral choice within them, a power that consists in the ability to plan a life in 
accordance with one’s own evaluation of ends.” (Nussbaum 1999). She develops ten 
capabilities that allow people to achieve their fullest potential. These include:  
 
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length …..; not dying 
prematurely ….  
 
2. Bodily health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; being 
adequately nourished ….; being able to have adequate shelter …. 
  
3. Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; being able to be secure 
against violent assault, including sexual assault …..; having opportunities for sexual 
satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction 
  
4. Senses, imagination, thought. Being able to use the senses; being able to imagine, to 
think, and to reason – and to do these things in …. a way informed and cultivated by an 
adequate education ….; being able to use imagination and thought in connection with 
experiencing, and producing expressive works and events of one's own choice ….; being 
able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with 
respect to both political and artistic speech and freedom of religious exercise; being able 
to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain 
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5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves; 
being able to love those who love and care for us; being able to grieve at their absence, to 
experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger; not having one's emotional developing 
blighted by fear or anxiety ….. 
  
6. Practical reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical 
reflection about the planning of one’s own life. (This entails protection for liberty of 
conscience.)  
 
7. Affiliation. Being able to live for and in relation to others, to recognize and show 
concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; being 
able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that situation; having 
the capability for both justice and friendship. …. Being able to be treated as a dignified 
being whose worth is equal to that of others. 
  
8. Other species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, 
and the world of nature.  
 
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
  
10. Control over one’s environment. (A) Political: being able to participate effectively in 
political choices that govern one’s life; having the rights of political participation, free 
speech and freedom of association …. (B) Material: being able to hold property (both 
land and movable goods); having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with 
others .  
 
Nussbaum classifies capabilities into three types: “basic capabilities,” “internal 
capabilities,” and “combined capabilities”.  
 
Basic capabilities are the innate equipment of individuals that is the necessary basis for 
developing more advanced capabilities. She points out that most infants have the basic 
capabilities for practical reason and imagination, though without a good deal more 
development and education they cannot use it. Healthy children have basic capabilities in 
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all the ten areas in the above list.  
 
Internal capabilities are states of persons that are sufficient conditions for the exercise of 
the corresponding function (given suitable complement of external conditions). Internal 
capabilities build on pre-existing basic capabilities by processes such as exercise, 
education, and training. Most adults have the internal capabilities of use of speech, 
capabilities that would not exist without the informal education that occurs along with 
socialization. Many internal capabilities require a more structured educational 
environment.  
 
Combined capabilities are defined as internal capabilities plus the external conditions 
that make the exercise of a function a live option. The aim of public policy is the 
promotion of combined capabilities; this requires two kinds of efforts (1) the promotion 
of internal capabilities (say, by education or training) and (2) the making available of the 
external institutional and material conditions.  
 
The list of capabilities is made up of combined capabilities and the items on this list are 
necessary as “a basic social minimum” for “what [people] are able to do or be” 
(Nussbaum 2000). These capabilities are so fundamentally universal to living a fully 
human life that Nussbaum believes they should be inculcated into the constitutions of 
every democracy in the world. While Sen and Nussbaum agree on the use of freedoms or 
capabilities for cross-cultural comparison, Nussbaum’s primary concern is with the 
universal application of capabilities and the foundational ability to support democracy 
and human dignity in societies (Nussbaum 2000; Sen 1999).  
 
An essential feature of the Sennian concept of freedom in the feminist perspective is the 
idea that a fundamental shift in perceptions, or ‘inner transformation’, is essential to the 
formulation of choices. That is, women should be able to define self-interest and choice, 
and consider themselves as not only able, but entitled to make choices (Amartya Sen 
1999; Gita Sen 1993, Kabeer 2001; Rowlands 1995; Nussbaum 2000; Chen 1992). 
Kabeer (2001) goes a step further and describes this process in terms of “thinking outside 
the system” and challenging the status quo. She offers a useful definition of 
empowerment that effectively captures what is common to these definitions and that can 
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be applied across the range of contexts that development assistance is concerned with: 
“The expansion in people’s ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this 
ability was previously denied to them” (Kabeer 2001). 
 
We employ this definition as a reference point in this study. Although brief, this 
definition is specific enough to distinguish it from the general concept of ‘power’, as 
exercised by dominant individuals or groups. Kabeer’s definition is especially attractive 
because it contains two elements which help distinguish empowerment from other 
closely related concepts: (i) the idea of process, or change from a condition of 
disempowerment, and (ii) the idea of human agency and choice, which she qualifies by 
denoting empowerment to imply “choices made from the vantage point of real 
alternatives” without “punishingly high costs” (Kabeer 2001). 
 
The Process of Empowerment  
 
There are various attempts in the literature to develop a comprehensive understanding of 
empowerment through breaking the process down into key components. Thus Kabeer’s 
(2001) understanding of ‘choice’ comprises three inter-related components: “resources, 
which form the conditions under which choices are made; agency, which is at the heart 
of the process through which choices are made, and achievements, which are the 
outcomes of choices.” The World Bank’s report on “Engendering Development,” 
(2001a) defines rights, resources, and voice as the three critical components of gender 
equality. Chen (1992) describes “resources, perceptions, relationships, and power” as the 
main components of empowerment, and Batliwala (1994) characterizes empowerment as 
“control over resources and ideology.” UNICEF uses the Women’s Empowerment 
Framework constructed by Sara Longwe, which encompasses welfare, access to 
resources, awareness-raising, participation, and control (UNICEF 1994).  
 
Resources and agency (in various forms and by various names, for example, control, 
awareness, voice, power), were the two most common components of empowerment 
emphasized in the literature. In many discussions, however, resources are treated not as 
empowerment per se, but as catalysts for empowerment or conditions under which 
empowerment is likely to occur. In the context of policy and evaluation, it may be more 
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useful to think of resources as ‘enabling factors’; that is, as potentially critical inputs to 
foster an empowerment process, rather than as part of empowerment itself. And, in fact, 
many of the variables that have traditionally been used as ‘proxies’ for empowerment, 
such as education and employment, might be better described as ‘enabling factors’ or 
‘sources’ of empowerment (Kishor 2000a). Although many empirical studies have used 
variables such as education and employment as proxies for empowerment, there is a 
growing understanding that this equation is problematic (Govindasamy and Malhotra 
1996; Malhotra and Mather 1997; Kishor 1995; Mason 1998).  
 
The second component, agency, is at the heart of many conceptualizations of 
empowerment. Human agency is a central concept in Amartya Sen’s (1999) 
characterization of development as the process of removing various types of 
‘unfreedoms’ that constrain individual choice and agency. Kabeer (2001) draws on Sen’s 
understanding of agency as well as his conceptualization of the links between individual 
agency with public action. Among the various concepts and terms we encountered in the 
literature on empowerment, ‘agency’ probably comes closest to capturing what the 
majority of writers are referring to. It encompasses the ability to formulate strategic 
choices, and to control resources and decisions that affect important life outcomes.  
 
Some characterizations of empowerment have included an additional component, which 
Kabeer refers to as ‘achievements’ and Longwe as ‘welfare’. And, in international policy 
processes, women’s empowerment is implicitly equated with specific (usually national 
level) achievements such as political participation, legal reform, and economic security. 
In the context of evaluation, we would argue that achievements are best treated as 
outcomes of empowerment, not as empowerment per se (just as resources may be more 
usefully construed as enabling factors or catalysts for empowerment).  
 
Identifying agency as the essence of women’s empowerment does not suggest that all 
improvements in women’s position must be brought about through the actions of women 
themselves or that empowering themselves is the responsibility of individual women. 
There is ample justification for governments and multilaterals to promote policies that 
strengthen gender equality through various means, including legal and political reform, 
and interventions to give women (and other socially excluded groups) greater access to 
  
 
27 
 
 
 
resources (for example, World Bank 2001a). National and international institutions have 
the responsibility for ensuring the inclusion of disadvantaged populations socially, 
economically, and politically. The major reason for the emphasis on agency as the 
defining criterion is because of the many examples in the literature of cases in which 
giving women’s access to resources does not lead to their greater control over resources, 
where changes in legal statutes have little influence on practice, and where female 
political leaders do not necessarily work to promote women’s interests. Thus while 
resources – economic, social and political – are often critical in ensuring that women are 
empowered, they are not always sufficient. Without women’s individual or collective 
ability to recognize and utilize resources in their own interests, resources cannot bring 
about empowerment.  
 
Having argued that ‘agency’ should be treated as the essence of empowerment, and 
resources and achievements as enabling conditions and outcomes, respectively, another 
caveat is necessary. While distinctions such as those between “resources, agency and 
achievements” (Kabeer 2001) or “sources versus evidence” of empowerment seem clear 
at the conceptual level, it is not always easy to completely separate them in developing 
empowerment indicators. And too, a given variable may function as an indicator of 
women’s access to resources (or an enabling factor) in one context, of women’s agency 
in another, and may represent an achievement in still other contexts. For example, 
microcredit programs and employment opportunities are often seen as resources for 
women’s empowerment. But if a woman seeks to gain access to microcredit, or to get a 
job, then getting the job or joining the credit program might be best characterized as a 
manifestation of women’s agency, and the benefits she draws as a result – income, 
discretionary spending, healthcare, etc. – as achievements. In some contexts, women’s 
economic contribution is treated as an enabling factor and used to predict other outcomes 
such as control over important decisions and even the outcomes of decisions such as 
family size or contraceptive use. But in other contexts women’s economic contribution 
would be more accurately described as a form of agency or, again even an achievement. 
Similarly, assets owned could function as sources of empowerment (for example, Kishor 
2000a) but they could also constitute evidence that empowerment had been achieved. 
The meaning of any empowerment indicator will always depend on its inter-relationships 
with other variables.  
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Empowerment is a dynamic process. Separating the process into components (such as 
enabling factors, agency and outcomes) may be useful in identifying policy interventions 
to support empowerment, and for evaluating the impact of such interventions, but it is 
important to realize that a framework for research or evaluation of a specific policy or 
intervention will refer to only one phase of the process. Which phase it refers to depends 
on the context, the interventions being assessed, and the outcomes of interest. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We have seen that empowerment is generally conceived as a multidimensional process, which 
operates at different and interlinked levels and is based on an analysis of power relations. 
Power therefore is often related to our ability to make others do what we want, regardless of 
their own wishes or interests (see Weber, 1922). Usually as illustrated above, many social 
scientists associate power with influence, domination and control, and often treat power as a 
commodity or structure divorced from human action. Envisaged in this way, power can be 
viewed as unchanging or unchangeable. Nonetheless, power exists within the context of a 
relationship between people, families and communities. Besides, empowerment is a social 
process, since it occurs in relationship to others. By implication, since power is created in 
relationships, power and power relationships can change. Therefore, the concept of 
empowerment also depends upon power that can expand, change or identify in a different 
medium. Thus, understanding power as zero-sum, as something that you get at somebody 
else’s expense, reduces the complexity of power and empowerment for that matter. 
Empowerment as a process of change, then, becomes a meaningful concept. There is no 
doubt that empowerment has a broader meaning and can be perceived differently. An 
empowered woman is one who has control of the decision-making, which impacts on the 
day-to-day wellbeing of her family. This concept of empowerment is entirely different from 
individualistic personal autonomy as presented by the DAWN in the 1980s. We have 
further pointed out that these power relations function in different spheres of life (for 
instance in economic, social, and political spheres) and at different levels such as individual, 
household, community, and institutional. 
 
Though the feminist theoretical analyses indicate that empowerment is a useful concept 
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because it emphasizes the idea of women as active agents rather than passive recipients 
of development strategies, it is conceptually complex and methodologically challenging 
to measure and analyze, especially in the context of assessing the effectiveness of 
particular interventions.  Although empowerment through income-generating activities has 
attracted various critiques, it cannot be discounted that in some cases microcredit stimulates or 
sustains an enterprise’s growth. However, often women accessing microcredit schemes show 
little awareness and readiness to challenge gender inequality, patriarchy, and lack of control 
over their personal and community resources. As Izugbara (2004) points out, the 
empowerment that the scheme promotes rarely goes beyond marginal improvement in 
small areas of women’s life, with its limited resources and within the conditions 
permitted by local patriarchal structures and institutions. The inherently complex and 
potentially conflict-ridden nature of empowerment itself means that any intervention, 
whether a microcredit scheme or other measures, will inevitably make only a limited 
contribution in isolation.  
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